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1. Introduction  
In 1982 the state of Malta threatened to sanction eight states; Denmark, France, Italy, 
Switzerland, Hungary, Spain, Greece, and Brazil (Morgan, Bapat & Kobayashi, 
2014).  These target states are all far larger than Malta, Malta however flexed its 
muscles and threatened to use economic coercion against them. Malta versus these 
eight larger states can be seen as a David versus Goliath story. A small state actively 
involved in coercion is seen as rather exceptional as small states are often analyzed as 
objects of great power rivalry (Holsti, 1970, p. 234). The relation between country 
size and the outcome of economic sanctions has primarily been studied with regard to 
the GNP ratio between sender and target. There are, however, more variables to define 
the size of countries. States can be categorized on basis of development level, or on 
certain economic indicators. In this paper the focus will be on a categorization using 
the variables population size, land area, and GDP of the sender and target of economic 
sanctions. The main question will be: how country size has influence on the outcome 
of economic sanctions?  
Small states, for instance, are seen as economically weak since the smallest are often 
dependent on bilateral assistance (Bartmann, 2002, p. 367). The economies of these 
small states are considered to be sub-optimal. Small states often have a small land 
area and limited natural resources; their small population gives them a shortage of 
human capital. A small population also means a small domestic market which cannot 
compete with products from other countries as the minimal scale necessary for 
efficient output is not reached. These constraints make it so that economic output in 
small states is often highly specialized and undiversified (Armstrong & Read, 2003, 
pp. 103-104). Political survival of small states is at the hands of the larger states. A 
small state is more vulnerable to pressure and more likely to give way under stress 
(Vital, 1971, p. 77). Small states seem to be more vulnerable to economic sanctions, 
as the economic penalties will probably hit small sub-optimal economies harder than 
those of bigger states. 
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2. Theoretical Framework  
The studies on country size and the effectiveness of economic sanctions have 
primarily focused on the ratio of GNP between sender and target. In 80 percent of the 
cases the sender’s GNP is 10 times greater than the target’s GNP and in half the cases 
the ratio is greater than 100 (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 89). However, in the binary 
logit regression model by HSE the GNP Ratio is considered to be statistically 
insignificant (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 189). Drury also concludes from his 
multivariate analysis that the GNP ratio between sender and target is insignificant to 
the outcome of economic sanctions (Drury, 1998, p. 501). Lam used the HSE data in 
his study but coded GNP ratio differently. Instead of using two dummy variables as 
HSE he used a continuous variable. Lam concludes that the success of foreign policy 
goals seem to be inversely related to the relative size of the sender country to the 
target. An explanation he gives is that foreign policy goals with small countries are 
less important to large sender countries. However, it is more likely to be a 
multicollinearity problem as the GNP ratio may be incorporated in other variables 
such as costs to target, costs to sender, and the trade linkage between sender and 
target (Lam, 1990, pp. 243-245). 
Sender countries are often very large economies. Trade between target and sender 
usually accounts for over 10 percent of the target’s total trade (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 
p. 90). Higher trade linkages are more closely associated with success episodes than 
with failures, but the difference is small (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 90). Lam concludes 
that the trade linkage has a positive but insignificant result on the outcome of foreign 
policy goals (Lam, 1990, p. 245). Trade linkage between sender and target is also 
statistically insignificant in Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff’s study (1997, pp. 
612-613). Drury however finds a positive relation between pre-sanction trade and 
sanction effectiveness (Drury, 1998, p. 501). Trade between sender and target also 
increases the likelihood of sanction use, as it may provide the means for economic 
coercion (Cox & Drury, 2006, p. 719). Small states have a very high level of 
structural openness to trade. This means that small states are more exposed to 
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exogenous shocks (Armstrong & Read, 1998, p. 564). Even tough small states have a 
high level of openness to trade they often trade with only a few states (Handel, 1981, 
p. 161). A higher level of openness to trade could mean a possibility to attract Black 
Knights.  
Black Knights are states that help sanctioned states, this helps to reduce the impact of 
economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 59). Early identifies two types of Black 
Knights, or sanction busters, ideologically driven sanction busters and pragmatic 
profit driven sanction busters (Early, 2009, p. 49). Examples of ideologically driven 
sanction busting behavior are the sanctions from the USA against Cuba and 
Nicaragua, or the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia and Albania (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 
p. 9). These episodes all occurred during the Cold War period. In this period poor 
small states could play the great powers against each other (Hey, 2003, p. 1). It could 
be possible that economic sanctions against small states were less successful during 
the Cold War. However, other studies focused on small states during the Cold War 
assume that small states could not depend on the great powers to respect their 
independence. And great powers seemed to see strategic relevance in intervening in 
small state domestic policies (Cooper & Shaw, 2009, p. 3). Keohane identifies three 
possible attitudes great powers can take with regard to non-critical interests in small 
states. They can support the policies of a state, they can intervene to control the 
policies of a state, or they can partially withdraw from a region (Keohane, 1969, p. 
69). 
Small states are statistically more likely to have a democratic political system than 
larger states (Ott, 2000; Srebrnik, 2004; Anckar & Anckar, 1995). Veenendaal, 
however, claims that smallness does not directly correlates to the democratic nature of 
small states. This means that the democratic nature of small states should be 
explained by other elements than size (Veenendaal, 2013, p. 15).  Economic sanctions 
are more effective when used against democratic states (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 
166). Democracies are more likely to use economic coercion than non-democracies, 
however they do not sanction each other often (Cox & Drury, 2006, p. 719). The 
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democratic character of most small states may make them more vulnerable to 
economic sanctions.  
The actual economic costs that sanctions impose on the target and the sender are 
important aspects on the outcome of a sanction episode (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 
101). The HSE study finds that sanction episodes seldom inflict heavy costs relative 
to the national income of the sanctioned state. This is because the sender chooses to 
impose limited actions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 105). Even though economic 
sanctions seldom impose heavy economic costs on the target, they can impose very 
high human costs (Pape, 1997, p. 100). In Drury’s multivariate analysis the costs to 
the target state is one of only two variables that have a statistically significant impact 
on the success of sanctions (Drury, 1998, p. 504). The act of imposing economic 
sanctions on a target country also has economic costs for the sender. The main 
domestic actors that bare the costs of the sanctions are the industries that are most 
affected. As most senders are large countries the impact of the imposed sanctions are 
often minimal (Hufbauer et al., 2009, pp. 108-109). When states impose sanctions on 
a target, they try to maximize the costs to the target and minimize the costs at home 
(Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007, p. 419).  
Typical categorizations of countries are often based on notions of development; there 
are ‘less developed’ states and ‘large and developed’ states (Downes, 1990, p. 71). A 
categorization based on development notions might not address the possible resilience 
or weakness of states to economic sanctions. Other attempts to categorize states on 
size have focused on geographical size, population size and degree of influence in 
international affairs (Hey, 2003, p. 2). A country categorization based on population 
size, land area, and GDP is likely to explain the outcome of sanctions better because 
these variables can be measured.  The population size of a country is an indicator for 
the size of the domestic market and the stock of labor force (Crowards, 2002, p. 143; 
Armstrong & Read, 2003, p. 100). States with small populations have a limited supply 
of domestic labor and they will have to invest more in human capital to compensate 
for their limited human resources (Armstrong & Read, 1998, p. 567). A larger 
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domestic market is useful in cases where the sanction episode causes a political 
response and support of the population for the regime, this is a so called ‘rally around 
the flag’ effect (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1988, p. 786). The land area of a state can 
provide an indication of natural resource abundance and variety (Crowards, 2002, p. 
145). The presence of natural resources can give states a form of leverage in sanction 
episodes. The Arab countries have, for instance, used their oil wealth in the 1973 oil 
embargo (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 90). GDP is a measurement for the total size of an 
economy. Smaller states suffer from sub-optimal economic conditions and are thus 
more likely to succumb to economic sanctions. Together the population size, land 
area, and GDP can shed a light on the total economic prowess of a state, and by 
extension the resilience to and capacity to impose economic sanctions.  
3 Data Operationalization 
3.1 TIES Dataset  
This paper will use the Threat and Imposition of sanctions, or TIES, dataset version 
4.0 (Morgan et al., 2014). The 4.0 version includes data from 1945 till 2005, and in 
total 1412 cases of threatened or imposed cases. The TIES dataset is substantially 
larger from the commonly used HSE dataset. The HSE dataset includes only 204 
imposed cases and no threatened cases (Hufbauer et al., 2009).  
3.2 Objectives  
The first objective of this paper will be to replicate the GNP ratio analysis of the HSE 
study in the TIES dataset. The second objective is to create a country size 
categorization based on population size, land area, and GDP of the countries. This 
categorization will be used as the measurement of country size for the Primary 
Senders and Targets in the analyses.   
3.3 GNI Ratio 
The first objective of this paper is the replication of the GNP ratio analysis used in 
HSE in the TIES dataset. However, the World Bank has stopped using the GNP 
measurement instead it has started to use GNI. GNI stands for Gross National Income, 
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the World Bank defines GNI as: “the sum of value added by all resident producers 
plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net 
receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from 
abroad (The World Bank, n.d.).”   
The GNP ratio is used in HSE as a measurement of relative country size between 
sender and target, the GNI ratio will encapsulate the same. In order to calculate the 
GNI Ratio the GNI values of the primary sender and target state are coded using the 
latest World Bank Data (2014a). All data regarding the GNI variable will be from 
2014. It is not possible to code GNI data for every case individually because of the 
limited scope of this paper. Instead a choice has been made to use the latest available 
data for every country. Because all GNI data is from 2014 some states that are present 
in the TIES dataset are missing in the added GNI variables . These missing values can 1
be explained by now non-existing states, non-World Bank member states, and states 
entangled in war. The actual GNI Ratio is retrieved by dividing the GNI of the 
primary sender with the GNI of the target. A high value GNI ratio means that the 
economy of the primary sender is much larger than the target’s economy.  
3.4 Population Size 
In studies on small states, population size has frequently been used as a measurement 
of country size. Cut-offs to determine whether a state was small, medium sized or 
large where essentially arbitrary. The cut-off to determine whether a state was small 
varied between 15 million to around 1.5 million (Crowards, 2002, pp. 144-145). 
The population size has been coded for the primary sender as well as the target using 
data from the CIA World Factbook (2015). All data regarding the population size will 
be from 2015. It is not possible to code population size data for every case 
individually because of the limited scope of this paper. Instead a choice has been 
 For the primary sender and the target the following states with their corresponding country 1
code are missing: Cuba, 40; Monaco, 221; Liechtenstein, 213; German Federal Republic, 260; 
German Democratic Republic, 265; Czechoslovakia, 315; San Marino, 331;Yugoslavia, 345; 
Djibouti, 522; Syria, 652; Taiwan, 713; North Korea, 731;Yemen People’s Republic, 680; 
Republic of Vietnam, 817 and Nauru, 970.   	7
made to use the latest available data for every country. Because all population size 
data is from 2015 some states that are present in the TIES dataset are missing in the 
added population size variables . 2
3.5 Land Area  
Land area has been coded for the primary sender and target using data from the CIA 
World Facebook (2015). All data regarding the land area variable will be from 2015. 
It is not possible to code land area data for every case individually because of the 
limited scope of this paper. Instead a choice has been made to use the latest available 
data for every country. Some states are missing because of this choice for 2015 data  3
3.6 GDP 
The GDP measurement uses data from the World Bank (2014b) and is coded in 
millions of US dollars. All data regarding the GDP variable will be from 2014. It is 
not possible to code GDP data for every case individually because of the limited 
scope of this paper. Instead a choice has been made to use the latest available data for 
every country. Because all GDP data is from 2014 some states are missing  4
3.7 Success 
In order to run a binary logistic regression the final outcome variable from the TIES 
dataset has to be recoded in a dichotomous variable with the values 0 for no change 
and 1 for success. In the TIES dataset the final outcome variable has ten possible 
values which correspondent with possible outcomes of sanction episodes. The values 
 For the primary sender and the target the following states with their corresponding country 2
codes are missing: German Federal Republic, 260; German Democratic Republic, 265; 
Czechoslovakia, 315; Yugoslavia, 345; Yemen People’s Republic, 680 and Republic of 
Vietnam; 817.  
 For the primary sender and the target the following states with their corresponding country 3
codes are missing: German Federal Republic, 260; German Democratic Republic, 265; 
Czechoslovakia, 315; Yugoslavia, 345;  Yemen People’s Republic, 680; and Republic of 
Vietnam, 817. 
  For the primary sender and the target the following states with their corresponding country 4
codes are missing: Monaco, 221; German Federal Republic, 260; German Democratic 
Republic, 265; Czechoslovakia, 315; San Marino, 331; Yugoslavia, 345; Syria, 652; Yemen 
People’s Republic, 680; Taiwan, 713; North Korea, 731; Republic of Vietnam, 817; and 
Nauru, 970.   	8
1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 10 more or less indicate a change of target behavior after the threat or 
imposition of sanctions, these values have been recoded to 1. The values 3, 4, 8, and 9 
indicate no change of target behavior, these values have been recoded to 0.  
3.8 Categorization of country size  
Countries can be categorized in a variety of ways, a measurement of country 
influence in world politics would have made sense as it may indicate coercion 
possibilities. However with the limited scope of this paper a categorization based on 
population size, land area, and GDP has been chosen.  
To make a categorization of country size based on population size, land area, and 
GDP the same cut-offs as Crowards are used (Crowards, 2002, p. 153). Microstates 
have a population smaller than half a million, a land area smaller than 7,000 km², and 
a GDP smaller than 700 million US dollars. Small states have a population smaller 
than 2.7 million, a land area smaller than 40,000 km², and a GDP larger than 2500 
million US dollars. Medium-Small states have a population smaller than 6.7 million, a 
land area smaller than 125,000 km², and a GDP larger than 7000 million US Dollars. 
Medium-Large states have a population smaller than 12 million, a land area 250,000 
km², and a GDP smaller than 19000 million US Dollars. Large states have a 
population larger than 12 million, a Land Area larger than 250,000 km², and a GDP 
larger than 19000 million US Dollars.  A state can have a GDP of a large state but a 
population size and land area of a medium-small state. The decision rule states that 
this state is categorized as a medium-small state if two of the variables fit in this 
categorization .  5
3.9 Cold War Period 
The TIES dataset lacks a variable for the presence of sanction busters or international 
assistance to the target state. Small states had during the Cold War era a prime 
possibility to play the great powers against each other. Sanction episodes during the 
Cold War period are possibly more likely to attract ideological driven sanction 
 See Appendix A for full categorization of countries. 5   	9
busters. To replicate this a dichotomous variable has been created in the TIES dataset 
for which all sanction episodes with an end year between 1947 and 1991  scored a 1 6
and all other sanction episodes a 0. This is far from a good measurement of the 
presence of sanction busters. However with the limited scope of this paper and the 
possible importance of sanction busters present in sanction episodes it is the best 
alternative.  
3.10 Costs to Target  
This paper uses the Target Economic Costs variable from the TIES dataset to measure 
the impact of imposed sanctions on a Target. The variable has three possible values; 1 
for minor economic costs to the Target, 2 for major economic costs to the target which 
result in significant macroeconomic difficulties, and 3 severe economic costs which 
halts the function of the target’s economy (Morgan, Bapat & Kobayashi, 2013, p. 11).  
3.11 Costs to Sender  
In order to measure the economic costs inflicted on the sender of an economic 
sanctions episode the variable Sender Economic Costs from the TIES dataset is used. 
This variable has three possible values; 1 for minor economic costs to the sender, 2 
for major economic costs to the sender resulting in macroeconomic difficulties, and 3 
severe economic costs which halts the sender’s economy to function (Morgan et al., 
2013, p. 12).  
4. Analysis  
4.1 GNI Ratio  
The first objective of this paper was to replicate and test the GNP ratio on the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions. As stated in the data operationalization, the GNP 
measurement has been replaced by the World Bank with the GNI measurement. In 
order to assess the relation between the final outcome and the GNI ratio a Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient has been computed. There was no correlation 
 The Cold War has no official start and end date. The Cold War started to take form in late 6
1945 and ended formally in December 1991 (Arnold & Wiener, 2012). 1947 has been chosen 
to not include World War II episodes.   	10
between the two variables, r= 0.065. n= 800, p= 0.065. Overall there was no strong 
relationship between success and GNI Ratio. The Pearson correlation coefficient does 
indicate that when the GNI ratio increases the chance on a successful outcome 
increases. However, this is not statistically significant. These early findings are in line 
with the findings on GNP ratio using the HSE dataset .  7
Because success is a nominal variable a linear regression analysis to test the influence 
of GNI ratio on the success rate is not possible. Instead a binary logistical regression 
analysis can be carried out, the success variable has been recoded into a dichotomous 
variable for this purpose. The first model  with only success as dependent variable 8
and GNI Ratio as independent variable shows, similar as the bivariate correlation, that 
when the GNI Ratio increases the likelihood of a successful final outcome increases 
as well. This effect is however very small and not statistically significant. The 
Nagelkerke pseudo R² also shows that this model is not capable of explaining the final 
outcome in a sufficient manner.  
 In order to predict the probability of the model for various levels of the independent 
GNI variable the predicted probabilities have to be calculated. To do this the predicted 
probabilities of the lowest GNI ratio value and highest are calculated. The lowest GNI 
ratio  is 0.0012, the predicted probability in this case is 0.52. The highest GNI ratio  9 10
is 75911.6, the predicted probability in this case is 0.99. Even though the highest GNI 
ratio has a very high predicted probability to result in success. The lowest GNI ratio 
has a predicted probability in the middle. The GNI ratio has probably little influence 
on the final outcome of economic sanctions.  
 See Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 189.; Drury, 1998, p. 501.  7
 See Table 18
 TIES case id 2000122002, Afghanistan vs the United States. 9
 TIES case id 2000120701, the United States vs. the Marshall Islands.	10   	11
Table 1 Binary logistic regression with dependent variable final outcome, and    
independent variable GNI Ratio. 
4.2 Country Size Categorization  
HSE claims that large countries are more likely to use sanctions against smaller 
economies (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 90). To test this a break down of primary senders 
and targets in country size categories is useful. Table 2 shows the make up of primary 
senders based on their country size.  Table 2 quite clearly shows that large states are 
the predominant senders of economic sanctions. Micro, small and medium sized states 
barely use economic sanctions. The only micro state that has threatened to use 
economic sanctions is Malta. Honduras is the only small state that has threatened to 
use economic sanctions. In Table 3 the frequencies are filtered to only contain 
imposed sanctions, here the domination of large primary senders is even more 
evident. 
Table 2 Primary sender frequency based on country size 
Table 4 shows the target state frequencies based on country size. Large states are the 
predominant targets, however the micro, small and medium states are more often 
Model A
B-coefficient S.E. Sig.
Constant 0.084 0.072 0.247
GNI Ratio 0.000081 0.000046 0.082
Nagelkerke R² 0.008
Frequency Percentage 
Micro 8 0.7
Small 1 0.1
Medium-Small 14 1.2
Medium-Large 22 1.8
Large 1154 96.2
Total 1199 100
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targets than they were primary senders. In Table 5 only sanctions imposed count, the 
percentage of large targets increases and the percentage of all the other sized countries 
decreases. The assumption that large countries are more likely to use sanctions against 
small countries does not seem to hold up. 
Table 3 Primary sender frequency of imposed sanctions based on country size 
Table 4 Target frequency based on country size 
Table 5 Target frequency of imposed sanctions based on country size 
Frequency Percentage
Micro 0 0
Small 0 0
Medium-Small 6 0.8
Medium-Large 7 1.0
Large 722 98.2
Total 735 100
Frequency Percentage
Micro 40 3.1
Small 29 2.2
Medium-Small 125 9.6
Medium-Large 145 11.2
Large 960 73.9
Total 1299 100
Frequency Percentage 
Micro 13 1.7
Small 14 1.8
Medium-Small 71 9.2
Medium-Large 84 10.9
Large 591 76.5
Total 773 100
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Table 6 Cross Tabulation primary sender and target based on country size 
Table 6 shows a cross tabulation between the primary sender and target based on 
country size. As can be seen in the previous tables, large countries are most often the 
primary senders and targets of economic sanctions. As the HSE assumption states that 
large countries are more likely to use economic sanctions against small economies. 
When micro, small and medium-small countries are considered to be small economies 
then large senders only threaten or impose economic sanctions against small states in 
13.2 percent of the cases. Large states use economic sanctions more often against 
other large states than against small states. The possible explanation of Lam for the 
bias of large states to sanction large states is that foreign policy goals with regard to 
smaller states are less important (Lam, 1990, p. 245). In this paper it may well be the 
case that this bias occurs because of the distribution of countries in the country size 
categorization.  
Table 7 shows a cross tabulation of imposed and successful economic sanctions based 
on country size. It shows that similar to the findings before, large states especially 
sanction large states. The HSE assumption that large countries are more likely to use 
sanctions against smaller countries does not endure based on this categorization of 
country size. 
Primary 
Sender
Target
Micro Small
Medium-
Small
Medium-
Large
Large Total
Micro 0 0 2 3 3 8
Small 0 0 0 1 0 1
Medium-
Small
0 0 0 3 11 14
Medium-
Large
1 2 4 6 7 20
Large 24 19 97 106 818 1064
Total 25 21 103 119 839 1107
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Table 7 Cross Tabulation of Imposed and Successful Economic Sanctions  
To measure the relation between the Primary Sender country size categorization a 
Pearson chi-square test is computed. Table 8 contains the corresponding cross 
tabulation of observed frequencies. A weak statistically insignificant association 
between success and the country size of the Primary Sender has been observed, χ2(3) 
= 1.400, p = 0.705. 
Table 8 Cross Tabulation of Succes and Country Size Primary Sender  
For the Target country size categorization a Pearson chi-square test has also been 
computed. Table 9 contains the corresponding cross tabulation of observed 
frequencies. A strong statistically significant association between success and the 
country size of the Target has been observed, χ2(4) = 13.898, p = 0.008. 
Primary 
Sender
Target
Micro Small
Medium-
Small
Medium-
Large
Large Total
Micro 0 0 0 0 0 0
Small 0 0 0 0 0 0
Medium-
Small
0 0 0 1 1 2
Medium-
Large
0 2 2 0 3 7
Large 6 5 23 31 161 226
Total 6 7 15 32 165 235
Country Size Primary Sender
Small Medium-
Small
Medium-
Large
Large Total
Succes No change 1 4 11 392 408
Change 0 6 11 441 458
Total 1 10 22 833 866
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Table 9 Cross Tabulation of Success and Country Size Target 
In order to run a binary logistic regression with dependent variable success and 
independent variables Primary Sender- and Target Country Size. The independent 
variables have to be analyzed as categorial covariates, using the indicator contrast. 
Table 10 contains the results of this logistic regression analysis. The categorizations 
for the primary sender as well as for the Target are not significant, not as a category or 
as individual classes. 
Table 10 Binary Logistic Regression with Dependent variable Success and independent 
variables Primary Sender Country Size and Target Country Size.  
Country Size Target
Micro Small Medium-
Small
Medium-
Large
Large Total
Succes No 
Change
7 7 41 48 304 407
Change 29 19 60 68 354 530
Total 36 26 10 116 658 937
Model B
B-coefficient S.E. Sig.
Constant 0.076 0.084 0.367
Primary Sender (ref: Large) 0.975
Primary Sender: Small -21.436 40192.970 1.000
Primary Sender: Medium-Small 0.299 0.651 0.646
Primary Sender: Medium-Large -0.032 0.463 0.945
Target Country (ref: Large) 0.487
Target Country: Micro 0.619 0.471 0.188
Target Country: Small 0.621 0.509 0.222
Target Country: Medium-Small 0.099 0.239 0.677
Target Country: Medium-Large 0.158 0.226 0.485
Nagelkerke R² 0,009
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4.3 Cold War Era  
Because of the possibility of small states to play great powers against each other 
during the Cold War, it is useful to have a view of sanctions during this era. Table 11 
shows that only medium-large and large states were sanctioned more during the Cold 
War era than during non-Cold War times. It may be possible that during the Cold War 
smaller states were deemed less important, or that they were able to defy the great 
powers. Table 12 shows that all but the large states were more active during the Cold 
War era than during the non-Cold War era. The smaller states were more active on the 
international playing field during the Cold War. Table 13 especially shows that large 
sender states were during the Cold War era very mild against micro, small and 
medium-small countries. During the non-Cold War era there seems to be no problem 
to sanction micro and small states. The large states seem to have followed the attitude 
to withdraw as identified by Keohane with regard to small states.  
Table 11 Cross Tabulation of Target Country Size and Sanction Era 
Sanction Era
Target Country 
Size
Not Cold War 
Era
Cold War Era Total
Micro 32 5 37
Small 20 6 26
Medium-Small 59 40 99
Medium-Large 40 69 109
Large 299 304 603
Total 450 424 874
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Table 12 Cross Tabulation of Primary Sender Country Size and Sanction Era 
Sanction Era
Primary Sender 
Country Size
Not Cold War 
Era
Cold War Era Total
Micro 0 0 0
Small 0 1 1
Medium-Small 1 8 9
Medium-Large 5 17 22
Large 398 385 783
Total 404 411 815
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Table 13 Cross Tabulation of Primary Sender and Target based on Country Size 
Distributed over Sanction Era 
As the Cold War era variable has two categories, a Pearson chi-square test needs to be 
computed to test the relation between success and sanctions episodes during the Cold 
War era. Table 14 contains the corresponding cross tabulation of observed 
frequencies. A weak statistically insignificant association between success and 
sanction era has been observed, χ2(1) =2.293, p = 0.130. 
Target Country Size
Sanction 
Era
Micro Small Medium-
Small
Medium-
Large
Large Total
Not Cold 
War Era
Primary 
Sender 
Country 
Size
Medium-
Small
0 0 0 0 1 1
Medium-
Large
0 1 1 1 1 4
Large 18 14 44 31 270 377
Total 18 15 45 32 272 382
Cold 
War Era
Primary 
Sender 
Country 
Size
Small 0 0 0 1 0 1
Medium-
Small
0 0 0 2 6 8
Medium-
Large
1 1 3 5 6 16
Large 3 2 32 49 251 362
Total 4 3 35 57 263 362
Total Primary 
Sender 
Country 
Size
Small 0 0 0 1 0 1
Medium-
small
0 0 0 2 7 9
Medium-
Large
1 2 4 6 7 20
Large 21 16 76 80 521 714
Total 22 18 80 89 535 744
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Table 14 Cross Tabulation of Success and Sanction Era  
The era of economic sanctions episodes is in the logistic regression analysis in Table 
15 also insignificant. The B-coefficient indicates that when sanctions occurred during 
the non-Cold War era they where more likely to be successful. Even tough the 
frequency tables indicate differences in sanctioning behavior during the different 
era’s, these findings are not statistically significant. 
Table 15 Binary Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable Success and Independent 
variable Sanction Era.
4.4 Individual Country Size Indicators  
In the first part of this analysis GNI ratio has been used to assess the difference of 
country size between primary sender and target. In this segment the variables that 
create the country size categorization will be briefly assessed. A Pearson’s R was 
computed to assess the relationship between success and population size of the 
Primary Sender. There was a statistically significant correlation between the two 
variables, r= 0.100, n= 879, p= 0.003. A similar Pearson’s R was computed between 
the variables success and population size of the Target. There was a statistically 
Sanction Era 
Non Cold War  
Era  
Cold War Era Total
Succes No change 171 200 371
Change 289 276 565
Total 460 476 936
Model C
B-coefficient S.E. Sig.
Constant 0.525 0.096 0
Sanction Era -0.203 0.134 0.130
Nagelkerke R² 0.003
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significant correlation between the two variables, r= -0.077, n= 983, p= 0.016. When 
the population size of the primary sender increases the possibility for a successful 
outcome increases as well. If the population size of a target state decreases, the 
possibility for a successful outcome increases. This shows that primary senders with 
large populations are probably more likely to have success in employing economic 
sanctions. And when the population size of the target is small the outcome is more 
likely to be successful. The population size reflects the size of the domestic market, a 
large target with a large domestic market is more capable of cooping with economic 
sanctions. And a sender with a large domestic market is more capable of continuing a 
sanction episode as it can for instance substitute certain sanctioned goods using the 
own domestic market.  
The correlation’s between success and the variables Land Area and GDP are not 
statistically significant. The bivariate correlation between success and Land Area 
Primary Sender is, r= -0.002, n= 880, p= 0.952. Success and Land Area Target is as 
follows, r= 0.009, n= 985, p=  0.768. Success and GDP Primary Sender, r= 0.042, n= 
869, p= 0.221. And Succes and GDP Target, r= 0.000, n=951, p= 0.991. 
 Table 16 Binary logistic regression with dependent variable success and the other 
country size indicators as independent variables 
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Model D
B-coefficient S.E. Sig.
Constant -0.085 0.171 0.620
Population Size Primary Sender 9.6885e-10 4.2523e-10 0.023
GDP Primary Sender 1.1564e-8 1.3515e-8 0.392
Land Area Primary Sender -2.8642e-8 1.9893e-8 0.150
Population Size Target -7.0458e-10 2.7986e-10 0.012
Land Area Target 3.1315e-9 2.0691e-8 0.880
GDP Target 3.9554e-8 1.686e-8 0.019
Nagelkerke R² 0.029
Table 16 shows a binary logistic regression with variable success as constant and the 
variables for country size as independent variables. The Nagelkerke pseudo R² score 
is rather low and this model is not well able to predict the dependent variable. Still 
three variables score in this model a statistically significant score, the population size 
of primary sender and target, and the GDP of the target state. The directions of the 
population size B-coefficients indicate that when the population of the target increases 
the success rate of the economic sanction decreases. Vice versa for the population size 
of the primary sender. The significance of the population size variables is in line with 
the assumption that a larger population can be translated in a greater domestic market. 
Important however to note is that the statistically (non)significance of these variables 
may be caused by multicollinearity. So it is difficult or impossible to discuss the 
relative importance of these variables. The analysis of these separate variables that 
compose the country size categorization may however be useful to stimulate further 
research.  
As three variables are significant it is useful to test the predicted probability of every 
significant variable separately. The first variable to test is the population size of the 
primary sender, the highest value  of this variable is 1,367,485,388, the predicted 11
probability in this case is 0.75. The lowest value of the primary sender population 
size  is 413965, the predicted probability in this case is 0.48. The predicted 12
probabilities show that when the population size of the primary sender is large the 
final outcome is likely to be successful. A primary sender with a smaller population is 
less likely to be successful, even though the predicted probability of 0.48 is not very 
low.  The second significant variable to test is the population size of the target, here 
the highest value  is 1,367,485,388 with a predicted probability of 0.30. The lowest 13
value  is 37,624, with a predicted probability of 0.54. These predicted probabilities 14
show that when the population of the target state is very large the final outcome is 
 TIES case id 1977070801, China vs. Albania. 11
 TIES case id 1982089905, Malta vs. Hungary. 12
 TIES case id 1990010402, Canada vs. China 13
 TIES case id 2001100201, USA vs. Liechtenstein 14   	22
more likely to be unsuccessful. When the population of the target is very small the 
final outcome is more likely to be successful. However the scores are rather close to 
each other, as the lowest population size scores only an 0.54 it is not truly able to 
predict the final outcome score. The last significant variable to test is the GDP of the 
target state, the highest value  is 18,155,790 million, with a predicted probability of 15
0.58. The lowest value  is 187 million, with a predicted probability of 0.53. These 16
predicted probabilities show that a sanction episode against a target with a large 
economy is a bit more likely to result in a successful sanction episode. The predicted 
probabilities however lie very close to each other.   
4.5 Costs to Sender/Target and Country Size  
Arguably the most important factor in the success of an economic sanctions episode is 
the costs it imposes on the target and sender.  To measure the relationship between 
success and the Costs to Target a Pearson Chi-Square has been computed, Table 17 
contains the observed frequencies. A strong statistically significant relation was 
found, χ2(2) = 16.334, p = 0.000284. 
Table 17 Cross Tabulation of Success and Costs to Target 
To measure the relationship between success and the Costs to Sender a Pearson chi-
square has been computed, Table 18 contains the observed frequencies. A weak 
statistically insignificant relation has been found, χ2(2) = 2.882, p = 0.237. 
Costs to Target
Minor Major Severe Total
Succes No change 188 30 7 225
Change 192 68 22 282
Total 380 98 29 507
 TIES case id 2000059901, Ecuador vs. European Union	15
 TIES case id 2000120701, USA vs. Marshall Islands. 16   	23
Table 18 Cross Tabulation of Success and Costs to Sender 
In Table 19 the results of a binary logistic regression using the dependent variable 
success and independent variables GNI Ratio, Country Size, Sanction Era, Costs to 
Sender and Costs to Target is presented. In this final model only one variable is 
statistically significant, the costs to the target. The B-coefficient of the variable costs 
to target shows that there is a strong relation between an increase in the costs to the 
target and the success of an economic sanctions episode. The Nagelkerke Pseudo R² 
shows a better fit than the previous models, however it is still not a very strong fit. 
Table 19 Binary logistic regression with dependent variable success and independent 
variables GNI Ratio, Country Size, Sanction Era, Costs to Sender and Costs to Target  
Costs to Sender
Minor Major Severe Total
Succes No change 217 8 1 226
Change 265 17 0 282
Total 482 25 1 508
Model E
B-coefficient S.E. Sig.
Constant -1.000 0.621 0.107
GNI Ratio -0.000012 0.000061 0.845
Primary Sender Country Size (ref: Large) 0.957
Primary Sender: Medium-Small -0.312 1.059 0.768
Primary Sender: Medium-Large 20.604 17440.825 0.999
Target Country Size (ref: Large) 0.948
Target: Micro 0.331 0.808 0.682
Target: Small 0.160 0.785 0.839
Target: Medium-Small 0.142 0.392 0.718
Target: Medium-Large 0.260 0.351 0.458
Sanction Era -0.179 0.238 0.453
Costs to Sender 0.447 0.586 0.446
Costs to Target 0.756 0.251 0.003
Nagelkerke R² 0.073   	24
The country size categorizations are both statistically not significant. This 
corresponds with the findings in segment 4.3. Segment 4.6 analyzed the variables on 
which the country categorization is based upon. In model D (Table 16)  the findings 
of the binary logistic regression analysis show that three of the variables are 
statistically significant. However, there is a problem of multicollinearity as these 
variables most likely have influence on each other. Both the variable GNI ratio and 
sanction era are also statistically not significant in this model. This is confirming to 
the findings in segments 4.1 and 4.3. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper had two main objectives; the first objective was to replicate the GNP ratio 
analysis that is used by the HSE study as a measurement for country size in the TIES 
dataset. It was not possible to use the GNP measurement as the World Bank has 
replaced it with the GNI measurement. Both measurements grasp more or less the 
same notion of the economic size of a state. The findings in this paper are in line with 
the findings of studies on GNP ratio that use the HSE dataset. As both the models A 
(Table 1) and E (Table 19) find the GNI ratio between primary sender and target to be 
insignificant for the outcome of economic sanctions. HSE and Drury ascertain a 
coefficient of 0.00, which means no influence. Lam finds a negative coefficient that 
would mean a negative relationship an explanation he gives is a possible 
multicollinearity problem. 
The second objective was to categorize countries based on population size, land area, 
and GDP.  The categorizations for Primary Sender and Target country size  are 
statistically not significant. Of the variables composing the categories only population 
size and the GDP of the target  was of statistical significant influence in the model D 
(Table 16). This indicates that countries with a larger domestic market are more 
resilient to economic sanctions. 
The categorization that has been made using these variables has shown some 
interesting features of economic sanctions on different sized countries. Small states 
have never imposed economic sanctions but only threatened with imposing them.   	25
Large states primarily sanction other large states. The HSE assumption that large 
countries are more likely to use sanctions against smaller countries does not endure 
based on this categorization of country size. The sanction episode split over the Cold 
War era and non-Cold War shows some especially interesting findings. Small states 
were during the Cold War era barely subject to economic sanctions. During the non-
Cold War era they were more frequently subject to sanctions. Medium-small and 
medium-large states were also much more actively involved in sanctioning states 
during the Cold War era. Large states were overall more active than the other states, 
but during the Cold War era they were the only primary senders imposing less 
sanctions. The literature gives two possible explanations for the few economic 
sanction episodes targeting small states during the Cold War era. First, it is possible 
that the great powers were not interested in the policies of small states. Secondly, it 
could be possible that small states were able to play the great powers against each 
other to their own advantage. It is curious that the Cold War period was in terms of 
economic sanctions episodes safer for small states. Even though the literature says 
they seemed to be less certain over their sovereignty. The Sanction Era variable is 
however statistically not significant in this paper.  
It might be interesting to see how the relation between primary sender and target 
country size and sanction frequency is using a different state categorization. As there 
are no agreed upon definitions of small states and large states the cutoffs used where 
still arbitrary. Even though the cutoffs where based on a study which sought to find 
natural breaks. It might be that this categorization has a certain bias towards 
categorizing most states as large. In this paper most states are categorized as large, but 
one must keep in mind that the sample of states that have used economic sanctions or 
have been imposed with sanctions is not a reflection of all the states on this world. 
Due to the limited time and scope of this paper it was not possible to code the GNI 
ratio, population size, land area and GDP for every corresponding case individually. 
Especially for the economic indicators GNI ratio and GDP this is regrettable. It might 
be possible that with values for every case individually some of the variables where 
significant.  
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All in all this paper has given  new insights at the relationship between country size 
and economic sanctions. In line with findings based on the HSE study the GNI ratio is 
not a significant factor that determines the outcome of a sanction episode. The 
categorization of country size used in this paper was not of statistical significant 
influence on the success of economic sanctions. Some variables that compose this 
categorization however where. Because of the possibility of multicollinearity it is not 
possible to attach any meaningful significance to these variables.  
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Appendix A. Country Categorization 
Country Size Country Name
Micro Barbados; Dominica; Grenada; St. Lucia; 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Antigua 
& Barbuda; St. Kitts and Nevis; Belize; 
Luxembourg; Liechtenstein; Andorra; 
San Marino; Malta; Seychelles; 
Maldives; Tonga; Nauru; Marshall 
Islands; Samoa. 
  	29
Small Bahamas; Trinidad and Tobago; El 
Salvador; Macedonia; Slovenia; Cyprus; 
Gambia; Djibouti; Lesotho; Mauritius; 
Bahrain; East Timor; Vanuatu; Fiji. 
Medium-Small Nicaragua; Costa Rica; Panama; Ireland; 
Slovakia; Albania; Croatia; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; Greece; Estonia; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Armenia; Georgia; Denmark; 
Iceland; Liberia; Sierra Leone; Togo; 
Central African Republic; Burundi; 
Malawi; Lebanon; Kuwait; Singapore.
Medium-Large Cuba; Haïti; Dominican Republic; 
Honduras; Uruguay; Belgium; 
Switzerland; Portugal; Austria; Hungary; 
Czech Republic; Azerbaijan; Senegal; 
Benin; Guinea; Gabon; Chad; Congo-
Republic; Rwanda; Botswana; Tunisia; 
Jordan; Israel: Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan; 
Mongolia; Cambodia; Laos.
Large United States of America; Canada; 
Mexico; Guatemala; Colombia; 
Venezuela; Ecuador; Peru; Brazil; 
Paraguay; Chile; Argentina; United 
Kingdom; Netherlands; France; Spain; 
Germany; Portugal; Italy; Romania; 
Russia; Ukraine; Belarus; Finland; 
Sweden; Norway;  Mali; Niger; Ivory 
Coast; Burkina Faso; Ghana; Nigeria; 
Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
Uganda; Kenya; Tanzania; Ethiopia; 
Zambia; Zimbabwe; South Africa; 
Morocco; Algeria; Libya; Sudan; Iran; 
Turkey; Iraq; Egypt; Saudi Arabia; 
Afghanistan; Uzbekistan; Kazakhstan; 
China; South Korea; Japan; India; 
Pakistan; Bangladesh; Myanmar; Sri 
Lanka; Nepal; Thailand; Vietnam; 
Malaysia; Philippines; Indonesia; 
Australia; New Zealand; European 
Union. 
Country NameCountry Size
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